My special interest in the Coptic question, which is known to many people, led me to conduct an in-depth study of the
history of Christianity in Egypt in an attempt to acquaint myself with the
source of Coptic culture in all its dimensions and aspects. This entailed establishing close relations with hundreds, not to say
thousands, of Copts, including many prominent figures of the Egyptian church. A number of Coptic friends asked me to write my
views on the so-called Coptic question, which some believe has reached a critical stage and others dismiss as an imaginary
problem with no basis in reality. Before going into the subject, I would like to state that the basic premise from which this article
proceeds is that the Copts are (or should be) genuine Egyptian citizens, that is, first-class citizens. Egypt is their country; they
are not living here by the grace of others but are fully entitled to
enjoy the status and rights of nationhood, as full partners, not as charity cases.
If this premise is disputed, there can be no dialogue. This article is not addressed to those who regard our fellow
countrymen of the Coptic faith as second-class citizens, allowed to live among us
thanks to our tolerance and magnanimity, nor, a fortiori, to those
who call for the imposition of the khezya (the poll-tax payment required of non-Muslims) on
members of the Coptic community. To engage in a debate with anyone who rejects the basic premise of
this article is to embark on an exercise in futility. No purpose would be served in trying to initiate what would essentially be a
dialogue of the deaf. On the other hand, if the reader accepts the
basic premise of this article as an incontrovertible truth, then there is
room for dialogue, provided, however, that no one presumes to speak in the name of the Copts, whether in
expressing their grievances or in denying that such grievances exist. Actually, not a single individual or entity in Egypt today,
official or unofficial, can claim that the Copts have no problems or
complaints. In writing these lines, therefore, I do not presume to
speak for the Copts but only to convey to the reader what I have heard over and over again from ordinary Egyptian Coptic
citizens who cannot possibly be classified as rebels or extremists. I am
familiar with the allegations of the extremists, which I will not go
into here. I will only write what I have heard – and believe to be true – over the years from those who can only
be described as moderate Copts.
A major grievance over which there is complete consensus within the Coptic community is that the right to construct new
churches or restore old ones has until recently been severely curtailed by
legislative and bureaucratic constraints. Although these constraints have been somewhat eased, most Copts believe the
situation is still far from satisfactory. I believe the only way out of
what is clearly an untenable situation is to unify the laws governing the construction and
restoration of all houses of worship, whether they are called mosques or churches. These laws
should lay down a set of rational rules applicable to all Egyptians
regardless of creed. For it is totally illogical that one segment of society should be
subjected to arbitrary constraints while another is allowed to enjoy unbridled freedom when it comes to
constructing places of worship or congregating to offer prayer when and where its members choose. Indeed, even when, as is
often the case, this leads to chaotic situations involving obvious
violations of law, people are too intimidated to challenge the offenders,
leaving them free to flout the law with impunity.
But while this is a major grievance, it is far from being the only, or
even the main, reason for the widespread feeling among Egypt’s Christians that they are living a tense moment, not to say a crisis
situation. They have a lot more to worry about than the need to obtain a license before they can build a new church. True, this is a
flagrant case of institutionalized discrimination that is totally unjustified. After all, what possible threat can the construction of
a new church represent? Churches are used either as houses of worship or as community centres where people congregate for
weddings and funerals and banning or constraining their construction is an abridgement of a basic human right. Still, the
Coptic community has other more serious complaints that can be summed up as follows:
-The existence of a general climate that allows for the resurgence at different times and in certain areas of the country of a
spirit of religious intolerance. Copts are finely attuned to this phenomenon,
as sometimes the mere mention of their name is enough to trigger a hostile reaction.
-There is a widespread feeling among Copts that their participation in public life has gradually dwindled over the last fifty
years. Their sense of marginalization is borne out by the facts: in 1995, not a
single Copt was elected to parliament.
-There is, moreover, the spectre of communal violence, which can flare up at any time as it has done in the past, most
notably in the Koshh incident.
A few analytical remarks on the feelings of unease these issues engender among the Copts may be useful here.
-With regard to the general climate which breeds a spirit of hateful fanaticism, this did not come about by a governmental
decree or a political decision, but was a natural result of the defeat of the
Egyptian revival project, especially after the June 1967 debacle. The vacuum was quickly filled up by a fundamentalist ideology and
culture, which put itself forward as an alternative to the movement for a new Egyptian awakening. With the spread of the
cultural values of this trend [whose members committed many crimes, most notably the assassination of Anwar Sadat], the
general climate fell prey to the forces of conservatism and regression which inevitably bred a situation of hostility towards the
Copts. As a noted Egyptian intellectual once put it, whenever the revival project is defeated in Egypt, this has negative
repercussions on two groups of Egyptians: women and Copts. The opposite is equally true: in a vital and dynamic cultural climate,
the attitude towards these two groups is enlightened and in keeping with the values of civilization and progress. It may be
unfair to blame the current regime for creating an environment which breeds fanaticism and allows the resurgence of religious
intolerance, with the attendant risk of communal violence. However, it is a fact that the government could, and still can, do
much to limit the dangerous polarization that has come to characterize the cultural climate in Egypt today. To that end, it
must adopt a policy aimed at the positive reinforcement of a culture of religious tolerance in place of the spirit of fanaticism
threatening us all. While educational curricula and information media are the right place to start, we must not forget the
importance of religious pulpits in shaping public perceptions. For
there can be no hope of progress if Islamic religious institutions oppose a cultural
project aimed at eradicating the spirit of religious intolerance which has taken hold in our society. That is
why Al-Azhar must follow the vision of the regime, not the other way round. To leave matters to the men of religion is to accept
the spread of a theocratic culture which logic and experience prove cannot possibly support a culture of tolerance and
acceptance of the right of others to differ, nor accept the notion of unity through diversity.
I am well aware that what I propose is easier said than done, and that the government faces a daunting challenge. But I
also know that the role of any ‘leadership’ [in the broad sense of the word;
that is, the executive leaders], is to formulate a vision and work
towards achieving it. To succeed, they must lead, not allow themselves to be led. It would be wrong to
claim that the regime is by its nature unwilling to face up to the challenge or that it is
responsible for creating the ugly spirit of fanaticism that has come
to pervade our society. However, it turned a blind eye to this aberration for a long time, only
slowly coming to realize that the ideology behind the culture of fanaticism is the main enemy of the
regime. It is this ideology which spawned the assassins of Anwar Sadat, the would-be assassins of the Addis Ababa incident and
the perpetrators of many other crimes.
-With regard to the widespread feeling among Copts that their representation in public life has shrunk considerably over the
last few decades, this is borne out by official statistics. However, this
should not be seen as a deliberate attempt by the regime to keep Copts out of public office. It should be seen, rather, as a negative
phenomenon that grew insidiously over the years, unnoticed by successive governments and driven by its own dynamics, until it
reached its present unacceptable proportions. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that the Copts are marginalized in
Egyptian public life and this is a situation that merits serious
study. I for one believe the explanation for the phenomenon lies in the mindset our public
officials have developed in recent years, which is characterized by a refusal to admit to the existence of
problems and an insistence on claiming that all is best in the best
of all possible worlds. This mindset is rooted in another cultural specificity,
which is a refusal to accept criticism and an inability to engage in self-criticism. To claim, as some do, that the
situation is of the Copts’ own making, that they have become marginalized because they are too passive and too taken up in
financial activities, is to put the cart before the horse. It is true
that the Copts are passive and that they are involved in financial and economic activities but that is a result, not a cause: the
result of having many doors closed to them despite their undeniable abilities.
Although I am deeply convinced of the truth of the above analysis, I am also aware that it is incomplete. The same doors
that are slammed in the face of highly qualified members of the Coptic community remain closed to many highly qualified
members of Egyptian society in general. The political game in Egypt today is
open only to those willing to play by certain rules established over
the last few decades, rules which by their nature are repellent to skilled professionals with any sense
of pride, being based on personal loyalty, nepotism and other mechanisms having nothing to
do with professional abilities.
-As to the violent communal clashes which flare up from time to time, most recently in Koshh and, before that, in Khanka,
to mention just two of the many violent confrontations to which our recent history bears witness, these are the result of a
number of factors, the most important of which are:
· An official line that seems determined to play down the gravity of the situation in the mistaken belief that admitting
to the existence of the problem would be detrimental to Egypt’s reputation. In fact, Egypt’s reputation would be better
served by confronting the problem head on rather than pretending it doesn’t
exist.
· The spread of a culture pattern characterized by ignoring problems, extolling achievements and singing our own
praises.
· A failure to make use of the many worthwhile efforts made to study and analyze the root causes of such
incidents, such as the famous report put out by Dr. Gamal Oteify on the spate of
communal clashes which broke out in the nineteen seventies. His findings and recommendations could have been put to good use
had it not been for a cultural propensity to dismiss the clashes as
a minor problem instigated by external forces for the purpose of destabilizing Egypt.
The purpose of this article is not to accuse or blame anyone, but to present an objective and neutral study which aims, like
the late Dr. Oteify’s report, to cast light on some elements of the problem. To accuse the government of persecuting the
Copts would be both illogical and unwise. But it would be equally illogical
and unwise to pretend that they have no legitimate grievances and that their situation is ideal.
I can think of no better way to conclude this article than with the following story: In the course of a debate on the Coptic
question, someone asked me what the needs and demands of the Copts were. I began with their second demand, then
moved on to the third, fourth and fifth. But what, he asked, is their first demand? I
replied that what they needed above all was a ‘social embrace’, in
the sense of being made to feel that there is a genuine desire to listen to them and hear their
complaints and problems, in a spirit of brotherly love and sympathy based on the belief that they are
equal partners in this land, not second-class citizens belonging to
a minority that has to accept and bow to the will of the majority.
For a real and comprehensive solution to the Coptic question, we need only look back to the time of Saad Zaghloul, who
established an exemplary model of communal relations that can serve as a
glorious point of departure for a contemporary project to lay this
nagging problem to rest once and for all.
There are good reasons why Saad Zaghloul is beloved of the Copts, and we would do well to emulate the example he set
so many years ago. These reasons were exhaustively addressed in an old article of mine which was published in Al-Akhbar
on 19 February 1987 under the title “Saad Zaghloul and the Unity of the
Two Elements of the Egyptian Nation” and republished later as a chapter in my book, “The Four Idols”.